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ABSTRACT
Background The 2014 European Union (EU) Tobacco
Products Directive (TPD) was negotiated in a changed
policy context, following adoption of the EU’s ‘Smart
Regulation’ agenda, which transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their
inﬂuence on health policy, and the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which sought to
reduce it. This study aims to explore the scale and nature
of the TTCs' lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how
these developments have affected their ability to exert
inﬂuence.
Methods Analysis of 581 documents obtained through
freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris
International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents from
the Legacy Library, web content via Google alerts and
searches of the EU institutions' websites, plus four
stakeholder interviews.
Results The lobby was massive. PMI alone employed
over 160 lobbyists. Strategies mainly used third parties.
Efforts to 'Push' (amend) or 'Delay' the proposal and
block 'extreme policy options' were partially successful,
with plain packaging and point of sales display ban
removed during the 3-year delay in the Commission. The
Smart Regulation mechanism contributed to changes
and delays, facilitating meetings between TTC
representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and
senior Commission staff. Contrary to Article 5.3, these
meetings were not disclosed.
Conclusions During the legislative process, Article 5.3
was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates
of the European Commission, while the tools of the
Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access
to, and inﬂuence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third
parties undermines Article 5.3.
INTRODUCTION
Tobacco is Europe’s largest preventable cause of
death, claiming nearly 700 000 lives in the
European Union (EU) annually.1 Although the EU’s
public health legislative powers are limited,2
the launch of the 1985 ‘Europe Against Cancer’
programme3 prompted a range of tobacco control
measures,4 including the 2001 Tobacco Products
Directive (TPD) (2001/37/EC) which regulates the
manufacture, sale and presentation of tobacco pro-
ducts. In 2009, the European Commission (‘the
Commission’) began revising this Directive in light
of new market and scientiﬁc developments and the
WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC).5 The process took over 5 years,
with the new Directive ﬁnally adopted in April
2014. The Directive, which includes an increase in
the size of graphic health warnings, a ban on charac-
terising ﬂavours, restrictions on the size and shape
of cigarette packs, and the regulation of Electronic
Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS) (table 1), must
be transposed into national law by 2016.6
While these changes represent signiﬁcant public
health advances, the ﬁnal Directive is weaker than
initial drafts7 (table 1). The review process involved
controversy, notably the forced resignation of
Health Commissioner John Dalli and claims of
tobacco industry interference,8–12 with the TPD
described as ‘the most lobbied dossier in the
history of the EU institutions’.13 Although previous
research reveals transnational tobacco companies’
(TTCs) efforts to derail earlier EU tobacco regula-
tion,2 14–16 the policy context has since changed in
ways that may mitigate or exacerbate TTCs’ ability
to inﬂuence EU legislation. On the one hand,
FCTC Article 5.3 entered into force in 2005,
requiring that ‘in setting and implementing their
public health policies with respect to tobacco
control, parties shall act to protect these policies
from commercial and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry’.17 Conversely, regulatory reforms
known in the EU as Better or Smart Regulation,
and shown to facilitate tobacco industry inﬂu-
ence,18 19 were implemented in the mid-2000s.20
Smart Regulation seeks to reduce regulatory
burdens and enhance business competitiveness via
impact assessment (IA), which attempt to estimate
the costs and beneﬁts of policies in monetary
terms, and stakeholder consultation in which those
affected by the policy are formally consulted early
in the policy process. Worryingly, British American
Tobacco (BAT), working with a large number of
other corporations whose products are potentially
damaging to health, was instrumental in promoting
Smart Regulation, anticipating it would make it
harder to enact public health legislation.21 In line
with BAT’s predictions, growing evidence suggests
that Smart Regulation can19 21 22 and has23 24
favoured corporate interests and might undermine
efforts to implement public health policies.19 21 22
We previously demonstrated, using quantitative
content analysis, that successive drafts of the TPD
shifted towards the tobacco industry’s preferred
position.7 We explore how the tobacco industry
engineered some of these policy changes. We
examine the nature and scale of TTCs’ efforts to
inﬂuence the TPD revision, identifying key entry
points used to access and shape the policy process.
We also examine whether Smart Regulation
enabled corporate inﬂuence on the TPD, as those
promoting it intended,21 and whether the
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application of Article 5.3 is adequate to prevent TTC inﬂuence
on EU tobacco control policymaking.
METHODS
We analysed a wide variety of materials. First, we obtained
2007–2014 reports, meeting minutes, and press releases from
the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/policy/
index_en.htm), Council of Ministers (http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/homepage) and European Parliament (http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/) websites. Second, rele-
vant web content (including press coverage, media releases and,
blogs) was identiﬁed prospectively through Google alerts estab-
lished in 2011 on BAT, ‘Philip Morris International’ (PMI),
‘Japan Tobacco International’, ‘Imperial Tobacco’, ‘Swedish
Match’, and ‘Tobacco Products Directive’. Third, internal TTC
documents were taken from two sources: 28 PMI documents
detailing its strategy to inﬂuence the TPD, dated 2011–2013
and leaked to health groups in 2013 (‘PMI’s documents’), and
17 (of 323 retrieved) documents obtained from the Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/)
(‘Legacy documents’) using search terms ‘tobacco products dir-
ective’, ‘TPD’, ‘tobacco directive’ and ‘impact assessment’, and
document dates 2007–2013.
Finally, to triangulate the industry documents, identify
whether actions detailed were carried out and further examine
the TTCs’ political activity, we analysed documents, all dated
2010–2013, released under EU Freedom of Information (FOI)
legislation (n=581) or given to the authors (n=2) (‘FOI docu-
ments’) and undertook four stakeholder interviews. The major-
ity of the FOI documents were released directly to the authors
(n=425) or their contacts (n=109) and are previously unpub-
lished, while others (n=47) were available online at http://www.
asktheeu.org (see online supplementary appendix 1).
Documents were analysed using a deductive hermeneutic
approach,25–27 that is, understanding documents’ content in a
wider policy context, while identifying conceptual themes and
subthemes (eg, corporate political strategies and tactics) which
were repeatedly tested as data collection progressed. Events and
meetings, identiﬁed from the documents and occurring from
2007 to 2014, were recorded in a timeline to map key develop-
ments, identify stakeholders and points of access to EU institu-
tions, and time the Directive’s progress through the legislative
process. We compared the time the 2014 TPD revision took in
each legislative stage, that is, in the Commission, then
Parliament and Council, with the original 2001 TPD.
Semistructured interviews were undertaken with staff of the
most active Brussels-based tobacco control NGO, the Smoke
Free Partnership (SFP) and three Members of European
Parliament (MEPs) (Twelve MEPs identiﬁed in the European
Parliament’s TPD ‘procedural ﬁle’ as key players28 were invited
for interview, but only three accepted). Staff of DG-SANCO,
the Commission’s department responsible for tobacco control,
were also approached but declined. Interviews were profession-
ally transcribed and coded using a thematic approach based on
the literature while also allowing for new themes to emerge.29
RESULTS
Tobacco industry strategy
PMI’s approach to the 2014 Directive was to either ‘Push’
(ie, amend) or ‘Delay’ the proposal, or block any ‘extreme
policy options’ which it identiﬁed as standardised packaging, a
point of sales display ban and an ingredients ban.30 31 Its strat-
egy detailed actions to be taken at each stage of the legislative
process. In the Commission, PMI aimed to “Block DG
SANCO’s extreme policy options”,30 in Parliament to “Break
ENVIs (Health Committee) full control on the dossier”,30 and
in the Council to “Create [a] blocking minority to any extreme
measures”.30
David versus Goliath
PMI alone employed more than 160 lobbyists and spent €1.25
million on lobbying to subvert the TPD.32 At least seven
tobacco industry lobbyists were former EU politicians or civil
servants.33 34 By contrast, Brussels-based health advocates had
ﬁve fulltime equivalent positions working on the TPD, with a
slight increase when the proposal was published in December
2012 (personal correspondence, SFP 12 May 2014). Comparing
the health to the tobacco lobby, one MEP likened it to a biblical
Table 1 Textual changes to the 2014 TPD
Key provisions
Commission proposal
19/12/2012
Council common
approach
21/06/2013
Parliamentary health
committee approved text
10/07/2013
Parliamentary plenary
approved text
8/10/2013
Trilogue agreement
(between commission,
council and parliament)
18/12/2013
Size and position of
health warnings
75% front, back and
top
MS discretion
65% front, back and
top
MS discretion
75% front, back and top
MS discretion
65% front, back and top
MS discretion
65% front, back and top
MS discretion
Ban on
‘characterising
flavours’
Yes Yes Yes Yes, menthol 5 years derogation Yes, menthol 4 years
derogation
Slim cigarette ban Yes No Yes No No
Ban on 10 cigarette
pack
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross border
distance sales
Notification, mandatory
age verification
Prohibit or notification
MS discretion
Prohibit Prohibit Notification
MS discretion
Traceability and
security features
Track and trace to
extend to the whole
supply chain
Track and trace to
extend to the whole
supply chain
Track and trace to extend to the
whole supply chain. No tobacco
industry solutions
Track and trace to extend to the
whole supply chain. No tobacco
industry solutions
Track and trace system for the
legal supply chain
Snus sales ban Maintained Maintained Maintained Maintained Maintained
ENDS regulation Medicines licence,
depending on nicotine
concentration
Medicines licence,
depending on nicotine
concentration
Medicines licence all No, only if they make health
claims
No, only if they make health
claims
MS, Member States.
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battle: ‘if you see who is ﬁghting on the left hand side and who is
ﬁghting on the right hand side…then you get a shock. It is David
and Goliath. It’s unbelievable’ (interview MEP, January 2014).
Third party mobilisation
PMI’s ﬁrst ‘principle’ for achieving its objective was ‘indirect
engagement over direct engagement’,31 describing third party
involvement as ‘key to success’.35 PMI sought to use a ‘3rd
party coalition’ to garner political support from non-health
Commissioners using four frames or ‘platforms’: intellectual
property, ingredients, retailers and smokeless tobacco.30 36 PMI
named 15 associations and 2 companies as coalition members,
including the European Tobacco Growers Association (Unitab),
European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade
Unions (EFFAT), and the European Federation of Tobacco
Processors (FETRATAB) leading on the ingredients’ platform,
and the European Association of Tobacco Retailers (CEDT) on
the retailers’ platform.36
FOI documents and Parliamentary and Commission meeting
minutes and reports conﬁrm that 12 of PMI’s third party coali-
tion partners (11 associations and 1 private company), were
actively involved in lobbying the Commission and Parliament,
and mobilising opposition.37–45 For example, CEDT established
a European retailers’ TPD Working Party which mobilised
member state retail organisations.46 47 In addition, we identiﬁed
126 associations and 33 non-TTC companies (17 public rela-
tions and law ﬁrms) that voiced opposition to the TPD, through
industry stakeholder meetings with the Commission,37 48
approaching Commission ofﬁcials and MEPs with their con-
cerns,49–52 participating in working groups to develop counter-
strategies or policy statements,46 53 54 making critical statements
in the media,55–58 and signing anti-TPD petitions59 (see online
supplementary appendix 2).
In ongoing work, we have identiﬁed 51 of 137 third party
associations as having ﬁnancial links with the tobacco industry.
Their interests and actions are consistent with PMI’s strategy.36
For example, many (44) were general business associations and
FOI documents reveal that PMI and BAT attended meetings
organised by Business Europe and the Dutch business
association, VNO-NCW, intending to build a Europe-wide busi-
ness lobbying presence to stress the TPD’s ‘spill-over’ effects on
other sectors.53 54 This spill-over effect (eg, on food and
alcohol industries) was emphasised in TTC lobbying of MEPs
(ﬁgure 1). Importantly, meeting minutes specify that the busi-
ness groups would not attend a formal tobacco industry stake-
holder meeting hosted by DG-SANCO, to create the perception
of autonomy from the tobacco sector.53
Delays in the commission policy process
The 2014 TPD followed the usual legislative procedure (ﬁgure 2).
However, a comparison with the 2001 TPD shows that, while
each Directive spent an equal amount of time in the codecision
stage, the 2014 Directive spent 3 years longer with the
Commission.
As the proposal needed to be adopted before the Parliamentary
elections in May 2014, this slow progress is signiﬁcant. We iden-
tify several potential reasons for it.
The IA stage
In line with the EU’s Smart Regulation agenda, and unlike the
2001 Directive which included only a brief IA,15 the 2014 TPD
revision was subjected to a comprehensive IA. This was not ﬁnalised
until mid-2012, long beyond the anticipated completion in late
2010.60 Two developments likely contributed to this delay. First,
after strong industry opposition to a RAND Europe study that pro-
vided the baseline for the Commission’s IA,61 DG-SANCO commis-
sioned two further studies,62 63 which had not been anticipated in
the ofﬁcial roadmap.60 Second, DG-SANCO’s public consultation
on the Directive attracted over 85 000 submissions, more than any
other EU consultation. The Commission attributed this unprece-
dented response, 57% of which were duplicates, to tobacco
industry-led mobilisation campaigns in Italy and Poland,64 while
PMI’s documents also indicate the industry’s role by revealing that
the majority of the 85 000+ submissions were ‘known’ to PMI.65
Delays to the Inter-Service Consultation
FOI documents identify three speciﬁc delays to the Inter-Service
Consultation (ISC), the Commission’s internal consultation with
Figure 1 Gifts sent to Members of
European Parliament (MEPs) in 2013
to stress the danger of possible
‘spill-over’ effects of Tobacco Products
Directive (TPD) measures into the
alcohol and food industries.
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Directorates-General (DGs) affected by the proposal, linked to
events at the highest level of the Commission (ﬁgure 3).
First, Secretary-General Catherine Day (the most senior EU
civil servant) and Legal Service’s Director-General Luis Romero
Requena requested that DG-SANCO postpone the ISC launch
scheduled for 22 August 201268–70 because there were “A
number of substantial issues needing further attention”.66 They
claimed that, despite the draft IA having been approved by the
Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 12 July 2012,
not all issues raised by the IAB had been addressed.66 They also
alleged concerns with the proposal’s legal basis, an argument
identiﬁed in a 17 August 2012 PMI document as appealing to
the ‘sensitivities’ of the Secretariat-General and the Legal
Service (see below).30 Emails between DG-SANCO and Day on
7 September suggest that, as a result, DG-SANCO removed
plain packaging and the point of sale display ban from the pro-
posal.71 Second, the ISC launch was further delayed on 23
September following concerns by Day and the Chief of
Barroso’s Cabinet, Johannes Laitenberger, that “it would be best
not to launch the ISC until after the October European Council
—this is a text that might well leak even from ISC and we are
keen to avoid too much controversy before [then]”.72 Third, on
16 October, days before the rescheduled ISC launch on 22
October, Commissioner John Dalli was forced to resign by
President Barroso in an opaque cash-for-access scandal, with
Barroso mandating that the ISC should wait until a new Health
Commissioner was in place.73 74 Ultimately new Commissioner
Tonio Borg launched the ISC 2 days after taking ofﬁce, on 30
November 2012, 3 months later than originally intended.
Despite FCTC Article 5.3, FOI documents show that the
Secretariat-General, the Legal Service, and Barroso’s Cabinet held
at least 12 TPD-related ‘meetings’ with the tobacco industry
between 2010 and 2012 (ﬁgure 3). Unlike DG-SANCO’s practice,
in line with Article 5.3, of publishing minutes of stakeholder meet-
ings on the Commission’s website, none of these meetings were
publicly disclosed. This includes contact from September 2011 to
November 2012 between the Legal Service and Michel Petite
who, until 2008, was Director-General of the Commission’s Legal
Service but, when the meetings occurred, was a consultant to PMI
in his role at law ﬁrm, Clifford Chance. Despite Legal Service
being aware of Petite’s new role,75 Petite was twice able to “set out
his views on some legal issues of tobacco legislation” and meet
with the Legal Service Director-General.75 This is notable because
John Dalli claims that Barroso asked him to shelve the TPD in
November 2011 because “his [Barroso’s] legal services were
raising many legal issues”, and that DG-SANCO ofﬁcials advised
him that the Legal Service only started raising concerns following
Petite’s involvement.70
Figure 2 Legislative process undertaken to review the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Source: summary of data collected from the websites of
the European Commission, Parliament and Council, accessed regularly between May 2012 and April 2014.
AGRI, Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development; CoR, Committee of the Regions; EESC, European Economic and Social Committee; ENVI,
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; IAB, Impact Assessment Board; IASG, Impact Assessment Steering Group; INTA,
Committee on International Trade; IMCO, Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection; ITRE, Committee on Industry, Research and
Energy; JURI, Committee on Legal Affairs; SCENIHR, Scientiﬁc Committee on Emerging and Newly Identiﬁed Health Risks.
1Special Eurobarometer 332 (May 2010), Special Eurobarometer 385 (May 2012). 2GHK Consulting, A Study on Liability and the Health Costs of
Smoking, Final Report (December 2009), Rand Europe, Assessing the impacts of Revising the Tobacco Products Directive. Study to support a DG
SANCO Impact Assessment, Final Report (September 2010), RAND Europe, Availability, accessibility, usage and regulatory environment for novel and
emerging tobacco, nicotine or related products (December 2012), Matrix Insight, Economic analysis of the EU market of tobacco, nicotine and
related products (September 2013). 3Smokeless tobacco (February 2008), Additives in Tobacco Products (November 2010).
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Cash-for-access controversy: ‘Dalligate’ or ‘Barrosogate’
A further delay within the Commission occurred following the
‘Dalligate’ controversy,76 which some MEPs relabelled
‘Barrosogate’.77 For details see TobaccoTactics.org.78 Petite,
acting as proxy for snus manufacturer Swedish Match (which has
a joint venture with PMI79), approached Day in March 2012
alleging that Dalli’s business associate, Silvio Zammit, tried to
solicit €60 million from Swedish Match in return for Dalli lifting
the snus sales ban that was included in the 2001 TPD but was
being reconsidered in the revision.80 After a written complaint by
Swedish Match in May 2012, Day referred the matter for investi-
gation to Giovanni Kessler, Director-General of the EU
Anti-Fraud Ofﬁce (OLAF), and shared the complaint with
Romero Requena, Barroso and Laitenberger.75
On 15 October 2012, OLAF ﬁnalised its investigation and
forwarded its conclusions to Day.75 The following day and, cru-
cially, days before the launch of the Commission’s ISC, Barroso
forced Dalli to resign, with the Commission’s press statement
stating that OLAF found that Zammit had approached Swedish
Match using his contacts with Dalli and sought to gain ﬁnancial
advantages in exchange for inﬂuence over a possible future legis-
lative proposal on snus.81 The Commission’s press statement
also noted there was “no conclusive evidence” of Dalli’s direct
participation, and “no transaction was concluded between the
company and the entrepreneur [Zammit] and no payment was
made”.81 It also emphasised that Dalli maintained his inno-
cence69 82 and in June 2013 the Maltese police stated that there
was insufﬁcient evidence to prosecute him.83 84 At the time of
writing, Zammit's trial is still ongoing.
Many questioned whether Dalli’s alleged misconduct justiﬁed
his punishment, given that Dalli had not beneﬁted personally,
and the text of the proposal had not changed as a conse-
quence.85 86 The Commission’s decision came under further
scrutiny when the secret OLAF report87 was leaked, presenting
only circumstantial evidence against Dalli, retrieved using ser-
iously ﬂawed methods.8 88 89 OLAF concluded, inter alia, that
Dalli’s unofﬁcial contacts with snus lobbyists (two meetings in
total, both in Malta and occurring at the request of Swedish
Match and the European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC))
had not been publicly disclosed and were a breach of the
Commissioner’s Code of Conduct and the FCTC’s Article 5.3.87
Yet senior staff from the Secretariat-General, Legal Service and
Barroso’s Cabinet met at least 12 times with the tobacco industry
(ﬁgure 3), without sanction.
Commission delays consistent with PMI’s strategy
To block ‘extreme policy options’ at the drafting stage, PMI
sought to trigger negative opinions from DGs other than
DG-SANCO,30 with ‘Barroso’s Circle’ (ie, Secretariat-General
and Barroso’s Cabinet) identiﬁed as having unequivocal power to
intervene.30 TTC and third party political activity was targeted at
DGs Enterprise, Trade, Agriculture and Rural Development and
Internal Market. Perhaps in an attempt to weaken DG-SANCO’s
position, or to involve the Secretariat-General, TTCs and third
parties criticised DG-SANCO’s IA and stakeholder consultation,90
arguing that it had failed to account for the proposal’s ‘unin-
tended consequences’ (ie, illicit trade).39 91–93
PMI developed ﬁve messages to undermine the TPD proposal
that would appeal to other DGs: lack of evidence, lack of logic,
lack of acknowledgement of the public consultation response,
failure of the IA to adequately assess impacts on the tobacco
market, notably illicit trade, and lack of a legal basis.30 All
except the ‘lack of logic’ message feature repeatedly in FOI
documents.93–98 FOI documents also show that the Commission
received various industry-commissioned technical reports,99–102
three of which are identiﬁed in PMI’s documents as ‘tools’ for
strengthening pro-tobacco arguments.30 103–105 Two of these
reports stressed and costed what the tobacco industry considered
‘negative’ or ‘unintended’ socioeconomic consequences.103 104 FOI
documents also show that Commissioners and senior ofﬁcials were
invited to tobacco industry events,47 98 106–109 including a BAT
stakeholder event on harm reduction and illicit trade,33 BAT’s
annual lunch with policy elites,110 111 and PMI’s launch of
KMPG’s (heavily criticised112) study on illicit trade.113
Progress through the parliament and council in codecision
‘Break ENVI’s full control on the dossier’
In January 2013, after 4 years in the Commission, the proposed
legislation moved to the Parliament and Council (ﬁgure 2). To
increase the prominence of market versus public health
Figure 3 Delays to the Inter-Service
Consultation and linked Undisclosed
‘Meetings’* with the Tobacco Industry.
Source: Letters and emails released
under Freedom of information
requests146–148 and Parliamentary
Inquiry.75 BdZ, German Cigar
Manufacturers Association; ECMA,
European Cigar Manufacturers
Association; ESTOC, European
Smokeless Tobacco Council; IAB,
Impact Assessment Board; ISC,
Inter-Service Consultation; PMI, Philip
Morris International; Sec-Gen,
Secretariat-General; TPD, Tobacco
Products Directive. *It is not known
whether all meetings occurred in
person.
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arguments, PMI encouraged the appointment of the Internal
Market Committee (IMCO) as co-lead parliamentary commit-
tee, alongside the Health Committee (ENVI) which would nor-
mally preside over this ﬁle. Interview data, however, suggests
that Dalli’s departure had resulted in rare, all-party support to
move the TPD forward, and that to assign IMCO co-chair status
would have led to another scandal (interviews, MEP and health
advocate, January 2014). As one MEP recalled, “we guessed
that the next tactic would be that they shouldn’t give [the pro-
posal] to the environment committee [ENVI]…, but it was
really a nonstarter…it would have been another scandal…they
shot themselves in the foot with that” (interview MEP, January
2014).
PMI hoped to generate opposition from the ﬁve appointed
Committees for Opinion (International Trade, Internal Market,
Legal Services, Agriculture and Rural Development and Industry
Research and Energy).30 31 To this end, PMI’s documents reveal
a lobbying offensive targeting MEPs as early as 2010, when the
proposal was still being drafted.114 PMI meticulously assessed
each MEP’s position on TPD policy options and sensitivity to
pro-tobacco arguments,115–117 identifying ‘heavy weights’
within each political group, particularly the largest centre-right
European People’s Party (EPP),118 and the Committees for
Opinion.119 PMI’s national ofﬁces approached MEPs in their
constituencies,114 where MEPs are more ‘off-guard’ without staff
reminding them of protocol (interview MEP, January 2014). By
August 2012, when the Commission had ﬁnalised the proposal’s
IA, PMI lobbyists had already met with one-third of MEPs
(257 of 754).30
PMI’s documents note that the Dalli controversy negatively
impacted their ability to access policymakers.31 FOI documents
and interview data conﬁrm that, at least temporarily, it
changed the political landscape against the tobacco industry
(interviews MEPs and NGO, January 2014). For example, pre-
viously amenable DGs120–124 became less inclined to engage
with the tobacco industry.125–128 In Parliament, the EPP, on
which PMI heavily relied for support,118 decided not to nom-
inate a candidate for TPD rapporteur (the MEP who reports
on the proposal and oversees its progress). Instead, in January
2013, Linda McAvan from the Social-Democrats was
appointed rapporteur, a choice PMI described as ‘hostile’.31
Interview data suggest that lobbying intensiﬁed thereafter, with
one MEP describing the tobacco lobby as ‘unbelievably power-
ful’ (interview MEP, January 2014). Whereas PMI’s documents
reveal that third parties were ‘activated’ to approach health-
friendly MEPs, often hiding their tobacco industry links,35
interview data suggest that former MEPs were purposively
recruited to approach MEPs on the basis of being ‘an old
friend’ (interview MEP, January 2014). Tobacco-friendly MEPs
also attempted to isolate inﬂuential MEPs within their own
parties who failed to support industry positions (interview
MEP, January 2014).
Various amendments tabled by MEPs appeared to have origi-
nated from the tobacco industry,129 130 including amendments
on ‘delegated acts’ outlined in PMI’s documents.31 One MEP
commented that ‘…amendments that came on most of the arti-
cles were clearly not written by the MEPs, and they weren’t
things they would normally have been aware of ’ (interview
MEP, January 2014). One MEP observed that it was TTCs’
innovative packaging, including lipstick-style packs targeting
young women, which swayed Parliamentary opinion, and led to
McAvan being given the mandate to move the TPD forward.
‘National level is key’: working through National Parliaments and
the Council
PMI believed the ‘National level is key’.31 Thus it tried to inﬂu-
ence the Commission’s initial proposal via national Health
Ministers and their ofﬁcials on the Commission’s TPD
Regulatory Committee. For example, PMI Netherlands, which
had cultivated a relationship with the Dutch Department of
Health,131–134 attempted to get the Department to delay the
proposal in the Commission, arguing that DG-SANCO’s con-
sultation on the RAND report was inadequate and inconsistent
with the Commission’s IA Guidelines.132
PMI also sought to mobilise national parliaments to cause
delay through the ‘yellow card’ system, triggered when a sufﬁ-
cient number of national parliaments issue a ‘reasoned opinion’
that the proposal does not comply with the EU’s subsidiarity
principle.135 This failed when only seven reasoned opinions
were submitted.136 PMI also sought to mobilise a blocking
minority in the Council through ‘third party mobilisation’,
attempting to frame the debate around employment and small
to medium enterprise issues.30 However, the Council reached a
consensus on 21 June 2013, with only Poland, Bulgaria,
Romania and the Czech Republic opposing it.137
DISCUSSION
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the tobacco industry considered
the revised TPD a serious threat and mounted a massive lobby-
ing campaign against it. PMI alone employed more than 160
lobbyists and met individually with a third of MEPs before the
proposal reached Parliament. Overall the campaign attempted to
shift the debate away from health towards alleged negative eco-
nomic impacts of the proposal and to isolate or weaken those
with an interest in health—DG-SANCO and the Health
Commissioner within the Commission, and members of the
Parliament’s ENVI committee. Former EU ofﬁcials now
working or consulting for the tobacco industry played key roles.
Lobbying was directed at all three EU institutions, with TTC
access and inﬂuence in the European Commission secured via
its highest echelons, the Secretariat-General, the Legal Service
and Barroso’s Cabinet. Intervention by the Secretariat-General
led both to the removal of the two provisions that industry was
most concerned about—plain packaging and a point of sales
display ban—and to repeated delays. We also show that these
interventions followed repeated, undisclosed contact between
senior Commission ofﬁcials and the tobacco industry in contra-
vention of Article 5.3. As such, PMI’s strategy to ‘delay’ or
‘push’ (ie, amend) the proposal appears to have been successful.
The evidence presented cannot provide an exhaustive
summary of all lobbying activity aimed at shaping the TPD.
Although we beneﬁted from the availability of PMI’s docu-
ments, we did not have access to similar data sets from other
TTCs. Nonetheless, it is clear from FOI documents and inter-
views that other TTCs were similarly politically active, and at
times collaborated. Data were also biased towards TTCs’ polit-
ical activity in the Commission (through FOI documents), and
to a lesser degree Parliament (through interviews), while less is
known about TTCs’ political activity in the Council stage and at
national level. The small interview sample reﬂects the reluctance
of EU ofﬁcials to discuss the TPD while it was still being legis-
lated. Further, the study does not examine the inﬂuence of
public health groups although it is clear that some, particularly
the SFP, played a key role in securing the TPD’s success.
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Our study has several implications for EU policy. First, the
EU’s Smart Regulation agenda, speciﬁcally its requirements for
stakeholder consultation and IA, in which the impacts of pol-
icies must be assessed and costed and ‘burdens of legislation’
minimised for ‘economic operators’,19 allowed the industry to
frame arguments, engage Commission staff, and delay the
Directive’s progress. These ﬁndings reﬂect BAT’s aims in pro-
moting Smart Regulation tools in the 1990s.19 21 Speciﬁcally,
the requirement that affected stakeholders be consulted early in
the legislative process enabled TTCs to input at the outset and
overwhelm the process by mobilising the largest ever response
to an EU consultation. The Commission’s intention to democra-
tise policymaking through stakeholder consultation138 clearly
fails to account for the ability of powerful corporate actors to
dominate this process. The requirement for a comprehensive IA
led to signiﬁcant delays so that the TPD proposal took 3 years
longer in the Commission than the original 2001 Directive.
Second, an important difference in TTCs’ activities in the
current versus the 2001 directive15 was their extensive use of
third-party actors. We identiﬁed 137 associations and 34
non-TTC companies that voiced support for policy outcomes
favoured by the tobacco industry; 12 were identiﬁed by PMI as
part of its ‘3rd party coalition’. This increased emphasis on
third parties likely reﬂects an unintended consequence of the
adoption of the FCTC’s Article 5.3. While DG-SANCO clearly
complies with 5.3,139 140 other parts of the Commission and
some MEPs do not. The fact that senior Commission staff held
undisclosed meetings with the tobacco industry, yet cite Article
5.3 as a key reason for Dalli’s dismissal shows a misinterpret-
ation and mis-implementation of the Article.
Despite the tobacco industry’s success in delaying and amend-
ing the 2014 TPD, it was still enacted in April 2014 and signiﬁ-
cantly advances EU tobacco control. Although plain packaging
was removed, pictorial warning labels covering 65% of the pack
were implemented and represent an increase of 25–30% from
current coverage. Interview data and press coverage9 12 76 141
suggest that the industry’s aggressive lobbying and its initial
receptive response within parts of the Commission, culminating
in the forced resignation of Commissioner Dalli, ultimately
backﬁred. Serious questions began to be raised by NGOs about
the transparency of EU policymaking and the inﬂuence of the
tobacco industry in the Commission. Furthermore, the widely
publicised leaked documents alerted MEPs to the tobacco indus-
try’s tactics, and the possibility that any contact with industry
might ultimately be made public.
Consistent with previous research,19 21 22 142 we show that
the EU’s approach to IA and Smart Regulation favours corpor-
ate interests over public concerns and economic over health
considerations,142 143 and can be used to delay and ultimately
prevent public health legislation. In contrast, FCTC Article
5.3, which aims to prevent industry inﬂuence on policymaking,
is poorly understood and inadequately implemented. The
Smart Regulation tools must be reviewed to ensure they serve
the public and not just corporate interests, uphold Article 5.3,
particularly in parts of the Commission not responsible for
health and in the European Parliament, and fulﬁl the EU’s
broader commitment to transparent policymaking. Evidence
that the tobacco industry relied on high-proﬁle former EU ofﬁ-
cials to secure inﬂuence reveals a need to revisit rules on the
employment of former Commission staff.144 145 With a new
Parliament and Commission recently appointed, including the
addition of a new Commissioner for Smart Regulation clearly
signalling a prioritisation of this agenda, these reviews are
urgently needed.
What this paper adds
▸ This paper demonstrates that third party actors have become
an increasingly important element of tobacco industry
lobbying and play a central role in attempts to subvert
European Union (EU) tobacco control policies.
▸ During the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) review, tobacco
industry access and inﬂuence was secured via the highest
echelons of the European Commission, the Secretariat
General, the Legal Service and Barroso’s Cabinet.
▸ Intervention by these elements of the Commission led both
to the removal of the two provisions from the TPD text that
industry was most concerned about—plain packaging and a
point of sales display ban—and to repeated delays to its
progress through the Commission.
▸ These interventions followed repeated, undisclosed contact
between senior Commission ofﬁcials and the tobacco
industry, signalling that Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) Article 5.3 is poorly understood and
implemented in the Commission, despite it being a signatory
to the Treaty since 2005.
▸ This ﬁrst assessment of how the Smart Regulation agenda
affects EU tobacco control policymaking since the system
was fully implemented conﬁrms previous concerns that
Smart Regulation enables corporate inﬂuence, and may
thereby undermine EU public health policy.
Twitter Follow Tobacco Research at Bath at @BathTR, David Stuckler at
@davidstuckler, and Martin McKee at @martinmckee
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank all who generously donated
their time to be interviewed. The authors would also like to thank those that shared
Commission documents released under freedom of information requests other than
our own: Fiona Godfrey (Independent Consultant in European Public Health Policy),
Smoke Free Partnership, Corporate Europe Observatory, and colleagues at the
Tobacco Control Research Group, University of Bath.
Contributors The study was conceived and designed by ABG and SP. HC and
SP collated the tobacco industry documents, SP submitted the freedom of
information requests and collated the web content, and ABG and SP conducted the
interviews. SP, with input from ABG and HC analysed the data. ABG and SP wrote
the ﬁrst draft of the manuscript. HC, DS and MM contributed to the interpretation
of the data, and revising the manuscript. ABG, DS, HC, MM and SP agree with
manuscript results and conclusions.
Funding This work was supported by the US National Cancer Institute Grant
Number RO1CA160695. In addition, DS is supported by a Wellcome Trust
investigator award. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does
not necessarily represent the ofﬁcial views of the National Cancer Institute or the
National Institutes of Health. SP and ABG are members of the UK Centre for
Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS), a UK Centre for Public Health Excellence.
Funding to UKCTAS from the British Heart Foundation, Cancer Research UK, the
Economic and Social Research Council, the Medical Research Council and the
National Institute of Health Research, under the auspices of the UK Clinical Research
Collaboration, is gratefully acknowledged.
Competing interests MM is a member of the European Commission Expert Panel
on Investing Health.
Ethics approval This study was approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Bath Department for Health in the UK.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement All freedom of information documents, internal tobacco
industry documents, and web content analysed for this paper are available on
request.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits
others to distribute, remix, adapt and build upon this work, for commercial use,
provided the original work is properly cited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/
114 Peeters S, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:108–117. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-051919
Research paper
REFERENCES
1 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment.
Brussels, 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/products/revision/index_en.htm
(accessed 7 Jan 2013).
2 Gilmore A, McKee M. Tobacco-Control Policy in the European Union. In: Feldman
EA, Bayer R, eds. Unﬁltered. Conﬂicts over Tobacco Policy and Public Health.
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004;219–54.
3 The ASPECT Consortium. Tobacco or Health in the European Union. Past, present
and future. Brussels, 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/
Tobacco/Documents/tobacco_fr_en.pdf (accessed 9 Apr 2014).
4 Cairney P, Studlar DT, Mamudu HM. European Countries and the EU. In: Global
Tobacco Control. Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer. Basingstoke: Palgrave
McMillan, 2012;72–98.
5 European Commission. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and
sale of tobacco and related products. Brussels, 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/health/
tobacco/products/revision/index_en.htm (accessed 7 Jan 2013).
6 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April
2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of
tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC. http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1399478051133&uri=OJ:JOL_2014_127_
R_0001 (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
7 Costa H, Gilmore AB, Peeters S, et al. Quantifying the inﬂuence of tobacco
industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco
products directive. Tob Control 2014;23:473–8. .
8 Vella M. OLAF carried our illegal wiretaping, MEP calls for Giovanni Kessler’s
resignation. Malta Today 2013. http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/
news/world/OLAF-carried-out-illegal-wiretapping-MEP-calls-for-Giovanni-Kessler-s-
resignation-20130321 (accessed 25 Mar 2013).
9 Hall M. Tobacco debate ‘hotting up’ as Council details leaked to industry.
Eur Activ 2013. http://www.euractiv.com/health/tobacco-debate-hotting-council-m-
news-519732 (accessed 7 June 2013).
10 Norman L. John Dalli: “You Become a Pariah”. Wall Street J 2013. http://blogs.
wsj.com/brussels/2013/06/11/john-dalli-you-become-a-pariah/ (accessed 12 Jun
2013).
11 Norman L. Email correspondence offers murky picture on Dalli’s resignation.
Wall Street J 2012. http://www.onlinewsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203937
004578079333672961470.html (accessed 20 Jun 2013).
12 Doward J. Tobacco giant Philip Morris’ spent millions in bid to delay EU
legislation. Guardian 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/07/
tobacco-philip-morris-millions-delay-eu-legislation/print (accessed 9 Sep 2013).
13 Corlett N. ALDE Priorities for the week of 23 Sept 2013. Parliament Agenda,
2013. 23 September. http://www.vieuws.eu/previeuws/parliament-agenda-alde-
priorities-for-the-week-of-23-sept-2013/ (accessed 25 Sep 2013).
14 Peeters S, Gilmore AB. How online sales and promotion of snus contravenes
current European Union legislation. Tob Control 2013;22:266–73.
15 Mandal S, Gilmore AB, Collin J, et al. Block, amend, delay. Report on tobacco
industry’s efforts to inﬂuence the European Union’s Tobacco Products Directive
(2001/37/EC). Smoke Free Partnership, 2009. http://www.smokefreepartnership.eu/
news/block-amend-delay-tobacco-industry-efforts-inﬂuence-european-union%E2%
80%99s-tobacco-products (accessed 2 Sep 2013).
16 Neuman M, Bitton A, Glantz S. Tobacco industry strategies for inﬂuencing
European Community tobacco advertising legislation. Lancet 2002;359:
1323–30.
17 World Health Organization. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 2003.
http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ (accessed 19 Mar 2013).
18 Smoke Free Partnership. The origin of EU better regulation—the disturbing truth.
Brussels, 2010. http://smokefreepartnership.eu/IMG/pdf/Report_version_
27012010_-2.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014).
19 Smith KE, Fooks G, Collin J, et al. Is the increasing policy use of Impact
Assessment in Europe likely to undermine efforts to achieve healthy public policy?
J Epidemiol Community Health 2010;64:478–87.
20 European Commission. Better regulation- simply explained. Luxembourg: Ofﬁce for
Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities, 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/
smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/brochure/brochure_en.pdf (accessed
13 May 2014).
21 Smith K, Fooks G, Collin J, et al. “Working the System”—British American
Tobacco’s inﬂuence on the European Union Treaty and its implications for policy:
an analysis of internal tobacco industry documents. PLoS Med 2010;7:
e1000202.
22 Smith K, Gilmore A, Fooks G, et al. Tobacco industry attempts to undermine
Article 5.3 and the “good governance” trap. Tob Control 2009;18:509–11.
23 Ulucanlar S, Fooks GJ, Hatchard JL, et al. Representation and misrepresentation of
scientiﬁc evidence in contemporary tobacco regulation: a review of tobacco
industry submissions to the UK government consultation on standardised
packaging. PLoS Med 2014;11:e1001629.
24 Hatchard JL, Fooks GJ, Evans-Reeves KA, et al. A critical evaluation of the volume,
relevance and quality of evidence submitted by the tobacco industry to oppose
standardised packaging of tobacco products. BMJ Open 2014;4:e003757.
25 Forster N. The analysis of company documentation. In: Cassell C, Symon G, eds.
Qualitative methods in organizational research: a practical guide. London: Sage
Publications, 1997;147–66.
26 Hill MR. Archival Strategies and Techniques. In: Qualitative Research Methods
Volume 31. Sage Publications, 1993.
27 Gilmore A. Tobacco and transition: understanding the impact of transition on
tobacco use and control in the former Soviet Union. London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine, 2005.
28 European Parliament. Procedural ﬁle: 2012/0366 (COD) Tobacco and related
products: manufacture, presentation and sale. 2014. http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/oeil/popups/ﬁcheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/0366%28COD%29
(accessed 12 Nov 2014).
29 Ritchie J Spencer L. Qualitative data analysis in applied policy research.
In: Huberman A, Miles M, eds. The Qualitative Researcher’s Companion.
London: Sage Publications, 2002;305–30.
30 Philip Morris International. EU Tobacco Products Directive Review 17 August
2012. 2012.
31 Philip Morris International. TPD Stage II Master Plan. Lausanne, 11 January 2013.
2013.
32 Philip Morris International. Copy of new Transparency Register. Lists of consultants
and their expenses. 2013.
33 Bowles J. Letter from Jack Bowles (British American Tobacco) to Ms Draghia Aklia,
Director of DG RTD. 7 January [Letter]. Brussels, 2010.
34 Corporate Europe Observatory. Tobacco lobbyist to become European
Commissioner? Exposing the power of corporate lobbying in the EU [Blog] 2014;
12 May. http://corporateeurope.org/blog/tobacco-lobbyist-become-european-
commissioner (accessed 21 May 2014).
35 Philip Morris International. Stats ﬁle. Predicted committee voting outcomes and
committee coverage information.
36 Philip Morris International. TPD Core Team meeting. 14 September 2011. Brussels,
2011.
37 European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General. Meeting with
stakeholders on the study “Assessing the Impacts of Revising the Tobacco
Products Directive” prepared by RAND Europe. Summary Record. Meeting date:
20 October 2010, 14:30. Brussels, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/
events/ev_20101019_en.htm (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
38 European Parliament Committee of Environment Public Health and Food Safety.
Participant list of Meeting with Representatives of Stakeholders in the Tobacco
Products Supply Chain, 19 March 2013, 12.30–14.30. Brussels, 2013. http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/envi/events.html?id=other#menuzone
(accessed 2 Feb 2014).
39 Wiedenhofer H, Wojciech L, Vedel F. Ref: Social and employment concerns related
to the forthcoming review of the Tobacco Products Directive 2001/37/EC and to
the Common Agriculture Policy reform. 12 October [Letter]. Brussels, 2012.
40 Global Acetate Manufacturers’ Association. RE: Meeting with [deleted as privacy
information]- Follow-up. 8 May [Email], 2012.
41 Mouvement des Entreprises de France. Révision sur la Directive des produits du
tabac—Position MEDEF- Comité de la Propriété intellectuelle-. 2012; 7 december
[Email].
42 Vedel F, Sacchetto C, Pellegrini P. Objet: Representants du secteur tabacole
europeen- Demande de rendez-vous. 2010; 4 March [Letter].
43 McAvan L. Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and
sale of tobacco and related product (COM(2012)0788—C7-0420/2012–2012/
0366(COD)). 2013. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f
%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bREPORT%2bA7-2013-0276%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%
2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN (accessed 2 Sep 2013).
44 Gagneur V. EFFAT—UNITAB—FETRATAB/meeting on the post 2013 CAP reform.
2011. 12 September [Email].
45 EFFAT, FETRATAB, UNITAB. Letter to DG AGRI dated 29 October 2013. 2013.
29 October [Letter].
46 Risso G. Tobacco retailers Position paper on TPD possible revision. 2011. 22 April
[Email and position paper].
47 Risso G. Letter from CEDT to Commissioner Ciolos dated 28 September 2011.
2011. 28 September [Letter].
48 European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General. Minutes of the
meeting between Commissioner Dalli and representatives of the economic
stakeholders active in tobacco products on 7 March 2012. Brussels, 2012. http://ec.
europa.eu/health/tobacco/events/index_en.htm#anchor2 (accessed 10 Nov 2014).
49 European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development.
Cabinet’s meeting with representatives of the European tobacco business,
Bruxelles, 20th September 2011, 11h. Brussels, 2011.
50 Vedel F. Letter from Unitab to Commissioner Lewandowski dated 23 November
2010. 23 November [Letter]. Brussels, 2010.
Peeters S, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:108–117. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-051919 115
Research paper
51 Mueller M. Subject: our conversation yesterday. 5 December [Email]. Brussels,
2012.
52 Polish Chamber of Trade. Ofﬁcial statement of Trade Committee concerning
Tobacco Product Directive (2001/37/WE). 2011. 16 February [Position Paper].
53 Bremen van H. Notes from meeting January 10, 2012 on EU TPD (Tobacco
Product Directive). 2012. 10 January 2012 [Minutes].
54 Bremen van H. Notes from meeting December 14, on EU TPD (Tobacco Product
Directive). 2011. 14 December 2011 [Minutes].
55 Paisley warns of severe job losses at JTI if tobacco directive gets green light.
Ballymena Times 2013. 19 November. http://www.ballymenatimes.com/news/
business/paisley-warns-of-severe-job-losses-at-jti-if-tobacco-directives-get-green-
light-1-5692174 (accessed 20 Nov 2013).
56 Fleming J. Lobbyists link EU tobacco curbs to rising crime, Roma. Eur Activ 2011.
http://www.euractiv.com/health/lobbyists-claim-tobacco-rules-threaten-roma-news-
506560 (accessed 17 Jul 2013).
57 Mapother J. Smoking kills- quit now. Tob J Int 2013. http://www.tobaccojournal.
com/Smoking_Kills___Quit_Now.51930.0.html (accessed 20 Nov 2013).
58 Briggs F. Forest urges retailers to lobby MPs and MEPs on EU Tobacco Products
Directive. Retail Times 2013. http://retailtimes.co.uk/forest-urges-retailers-lobby-
mps-meps-eu-tobacco-products-directive/# (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
59 Confederation Europeenne des Detaillants en Tabac. Declaration of intentions for
a sustainable future of the tobacco sector. 2012. Undated [Position paper].
60 DG SANCO. Roadmap: revision of the tobacco products directive. Brussels, 2010.
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/46_sanco_tobacco_
products_directive_en.pdf (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
61 Rand Europe. Assesssing the Impacts of Revising the Tobacco Products Directive.
Study to support a DG SANCO Impact Assessment. Final Report. 2010. http://ec.
europa.eu/health/tobacco/products/revision/index_en.htm (accessed 11 Apr 2014).
62 Matrix Insight. Economic analysis of the EU market of tobacco, nicotine & related
products, Revised Final Report. 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/
tobacco_matrix_report_eu_market_en.pdf (accessed 20 May 2014).
63 RAND Europe. Availability, accessibility, usage & regulatory environment for novel
& emerging tobacco, nicotine or related products. 2012. http://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR211.html (accessed 20 May 2014).
64 European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General. Report on the
public consultation on the possible revision of the Tobacco Products Directive
(2001/37/EC). Brussels, 2011. http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/consultations/
tobacco_cons_01_en.htm (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
65 Philip Morris International. EU in Practice. April 11th, 2012. Croatia, 2012.
66 Day C, Romero Requena L. Forthcoming legislative proposal on the revision of the
tobacco product directive. 25 July 2012 [Letter]. Brussels, 2012.
67 Day C. Letter from Catherine Day to Swedish Match’s General Counsel in response
to ofﬁcial complaint made by Swedish Match on 14 May 2012. 2012. 30 May
[Letter].
68 New Europe. New Europe interview with John Dalli. [Video] 2012. 17 October.
http://www.neurope.eu/article/exclusive-john-dalli-interview-olaf-resignation-
tobacco-directive-video (accessed 18 Oct 2012).
69 Vella M. [WATCH] ‘I expected Barroso to support me’—Dalli. Malta Today 2012.
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/news/national/WATCH-I-expected-
Barroso-to-support-me-Dalli-20121020 (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
70 Mangion C. Dalli: ‘Barroso was against the tobacco products directive’. Malta
Today 2014. http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/dalligate/36855/dalli_barroso_
was_against_the_tobacco_products_directive (accessed 17 Mar 2014).
71 Testori Coggi P. Email from Paola Testori Coggi to Catherine Day and Luis Romero
Requena dated 7 September 2012. 2012. 7 September [Email].
72 Day C. Email from Catherine Day to Paola Testori Coggi dated 23 September
2012. [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
73 Vella M. Barroso to MEPs, no work on tobacco review until Borg is commissioner.
Malta Today 2012. http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/world/22071/barroso-to-
meps-no-work-on-tobacco-review-until-borg-is-commissioner-20121023#.
U0kxd0ZOUaI (accessed 12 Apr 2014).
74 ‘We need to wait’- Barroso on Tobacco Products Directive. New Europe 2012.
23 October. http://www.neurope.eu/article/we-need-wait-barroso-tobacco-products-
directive (accessed 12 Apr 2014).
75 European Commission and OLAF. Replies to the Questionnaire from the Committee
on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament concerning the resignation of
the former Commissioner John Dalli. Brussels, 2012. http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/committees/en/cont/subject-ﬁles.html?id=20121211CDT57804 (accessed 9 Apr
2013).
76 European Commission: “Dalligate” spreads like wildﬁre in Brussels. Presseurop
2012; 25 October. http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/2942321-
dalligate-spreads-wildﬁre-brussels (accessed 21 Aug 2013).
77 Update: No longer Dalligate but Barrosogate- Green MEP. Malta Star 2013;
7 May. http://www.maltastar.com/dart/20130507-dalligate-green-meps-meet-
maltese-ofﬁcials (accessed 2 Sep 2013).
78 Tobacco Control Research Group. TPD: Dalligate. TobaccoTactics, 2013. http://
tobaccotactics.org/index.php/TPD:_DalliGate (accessed 6 Nov 2014).
79 Swedish Match. Press Release 3 Feb 2009: Swedish Match and Philip Morris
International announce global joint venture to commercialize smokefree tobacco
products. 2009. http://www.swedishmatch.com/en/Media/Pressreleases/
(accessed: 5 Sep 2011).
80 European Anti-Fraud Ofﬁce. Written Record of Interview with Witness: Mr Fredrik
Peyron, 2 June 2012. OLAF Final Report no. OF/2012/0617. 2012.
81 European Commission. Press statement on behalf of the European Commission.
Brussels, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-788_en.htm
(accessed 16 Oct 2012).
82 Lindsay D. Dalli claims his ‘entrapment orchestrated from the very beginning’.
Malta Independent 2013. http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-06-16/
news/dalli-claims-his-entrapment-orchestrated-from-the-very-beginning-
1834713088/ (accessed 2 Sep 2013).
83 No criminal case against John Dalli- Police Commissioner. Times of Malta. 8 June
2013. Available from: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130608/local/
no-criminal-case-against-john-dalli-police-commissioner.473049 (accessed
19 Feb 2015).
84 Malta rules out legal action against former EU Commissioner. Reuters 2013;
10 June. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/10/malta-eu-commissioner-
idUSL6N0EM00020130610 (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
85 McKee M, Belcher P, Kosinska M. Comment: the tobacco products directive must
not be derailed. Lancet 2012;380:1447–8.
86 Dalligate: Transparency group says Barroso’s people met tobacco lobbyists. Times
of Malta 2012; 15 December. http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/
20121215/local/transparency-group-says-barroso-s-people-met-tobacco-group.
449676 (accessed 15 Apr 2014).
87 Giovanni Kessler. Transmission of information following a closure of investigation.
Brussels, 2012. http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/news/dalligate/Olaf-
report-00720130427 (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
88 Ingeborg Grassle. Working document: analysis of the failings of the OLAF
investigation. Brussels, 2013. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
type=COMPARL&reference=PE-510.771&format=PDF&language=EN&
secondRef=01 (accessed 10 Nov 2014).
89 OLAF Supervisory Committee. Activity Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee
January 2012–January 2013. 2013. http://www.scribd.com/doc/137703980/OLAF-
Supervisory-Committee-Annual-Report-2012 (accessed 10 Nov 2014).
90 Bota P. Open letter—meeting request from tobacco growers from Romania and
Bulgaria. 2012; 5 December [Email].
91 Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers. CECCM mail on
TPD revision. 2012; 11 December [Email].
92 Confederation Generale des Petites et Moyenne Entreprises. Letter from CGPME
to Commissioner Tajani dated 21 September 2012. 2012; 21 September [Letter].
93 European Federation of Food Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions. EFFAT
submission to DG SANCO on the public consultation on the RAND report and on
the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 2001/37/EC. 2010; 1 December
[Position paper].
94 Institute of Practitioners in Advertising. Re: Institute of Practitioners in Advertising
(IPA) states concerns about trademark issues in context with the plain packaging
proposals in the Tobacco Products Directive. 15 December [Letter]. London, 2010.
95 Nowakowski W. Letter from the Polish Chamber of Commerce to President Barroso
dated 5 October 2011. [Letter]. Przewodniczący Komitetu Handiu, 2010.
96 Panucci M. Letter from Conﬁndustria to European Commission President Barroso
dated 28 September 2012. 28 September [Letter]. Rome, 2012.
97 Vanheukelen M. Letter from Head of de Gucht’s Cabinet Marc Vanheukelen to
Karla Jones representing ALEC. 2011; 11 June 2011 [Letter].
98 Risso G. Letter from CEDT to Karel de Gucht titled European Parliament Round
Table 24.05.11. 2011; [Email].
99 Oxera. Proposed revisions to the Tobacco Products Directive. A review of the
European Commission’s regulatory impact assessment. Japan Tobacco
International, 2013. http://www.jti.com/how-we-do-business/key-regulatory-
submissions/ (accessed 17 Oct 2013).
100 Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. The New Tobacco Products Directive. Potential
Economic Impact. 2013. http://www.rolandberger.com/media/publications/2013-
04-24-rbsc-pub-The_New_Tobacco_Products_Directive.html (accessed 11 Nov 2014).
101 De Molli V. Letter from The European House Ambrosetti to European Commission
President Mr Jose Manual Barroso dated 5 September 2012. 5 September [Letter].
Milan: The European House Ambrosetti, 2012.
102 KPMG. Project Star 2011 Results. 2012. http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_
regulation/illicit_trade/documents/project%20star%202011%20results.pdf
(accessed 23 Jun 2014).
103 Nomisma. The cultivation of tobacco in the European Union and the impact
deriving from the Changes in Directive 2001/37/EC. Analysis of socio-economic
impact, 2010.
104 Calderoni F, Savona EU, Solmi S. Crime prooﬁng the policy options for the revision
of the Tobacco Products Directive. Prooﬁng the policy options under consideration
for the revision of EU Directive 2001/37/EC against the risks of unintended
criminal opportunities. 2012.
116 Peeters S, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:108–117. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-051919
Research paper
105 Minhoff C, Mrohs A. Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 2001/37/EC.
6 December [Letter]. Berlin, 2012.
106 Benyei I. Letter from Magyar Dohanytermelok Orszagos Szovetsege to
Commissioner Ciolos dated 29 July 2011. 29 July [Letter]. Pocspetri, 2011.
107 Unitab. Invitation to the Cabinet of the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural
Development, for dinner-debate in the presence Mr Marek Sawicki on the theme
‘The future of small farms with intensive workforce requirements in th epost-2013
cap: the case of tobacco-growing’. 20 April [Letter]. Paris, 2011.
108 Karapyta M, Ptaszynski M. Letter from East Poland House in Brussels to
Commissioner Ciolos dated 29 June 2012. 29 June [Letter]. Brussels, 2012.
109 Ujupan A-S. RE: Invitation au 33ème congrès de l’UNITAB -18-20 octobre 2012,
Budapest -ARES/784077. 9 July [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
110 Trevilly Y. Letter from British American Tobacco to Commissioner Michel Barnier
dated 1 June 2011.; 1 June 2011 [Letter]. Boulogne-Billlancourt, 2011.
111 Trevilly Y. Objet: invitation au prochain dejeuner du CPAH. 5 June [Letter].
Boulogne-Billancourt, 2012.
112 Gilmore AB, Rowell A, Gallus S, et al. Towards a greater understanding of the
illicit tobacco trade in Europe: a review of the PMI funded ‘Project Star’ report.
Tob Control 2014;23:e51–61.
113 Doms K. Philip Morris International invite to presentation of the KPMG study on
illicit tobacco trade. 2011; 14 June 2011 [Letter].
114 Philip Morris International. AA Master File. Background information and meeting
details of most MEPs by country. 2012.
115 Philip Morris International. “EU Tobacco Products Directive Review”—strategy
meeting presentation II, 17 August 2012. 2012.
116 Philip Morris International. ENVI MEP Stimulator 2.08.2012. Positions of MEPs in
ENVI. 2012.
117 Philip Morris International. IMCO MEPs. List of MEPs in IMCO. 2012.
118 Philip Morris International. “ENVI analysis”. 2013.
119 Philip Morris International. “EU Tobacco Products Directive Review”—strategy
presentation for meeting 17 August 2012. 2012.
120 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. Réunion
CECCM 12/07 9h30—10h30. 12 July [Minutes]. Brussels, 2012.
121 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. Meeting with
GAMA—2012-05-16. 16 May [Minutes]. Brussels, 2012.
122 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. Meeting with
cigars producers. 15 September [Minutes]. Brussels: European Commission, 2011.
123 British American Tobacco Representation Brussels. Meeting 8 March 2012. 2012;
14 March [Email].
124 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. RE: Meeting
with ESTA—02/08/2012. 3 August [Minutes]. Brussels, 2012.
125 European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry. Re;Reunion.
18 October [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
126 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. Re: Reunion.
1 December [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
127 European Smoking Tobacco Association. RE: Reunion. 2012; 30 November [Email].
128 European Commission Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. FW: CECCM
mail on TPD revision. 12 December [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
129 Corporate Europe Observatory. Tobacco lobbyists all ﬁred up ahead of key vote.
Brussels, 2013. http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/ﬁles/attachments/tobacco_
lobbyists_all_ﬁred_up_ahead_of_key_vote.pdf (accessed 29 May 2014).
130 Smoke Free Partnership. Comparison of PMI objectives and plenary amendments.
Smoke Free Partnership, Brussels, 2013.
131 RE: fabrieksbezoek Philip Morris Holland. 2010 Collection. Bates No: JB0642.
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hro18j00 (accessed 12 Sep 2013).
132 Philip Morris Holland BV. Impact Assessment herziening Tabaksproductenrichtlijn.
2009 Collection. Bates No: JB0680. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tso18j00
(accessed 3 May 2014).
133 Philip Morris Benelux BVBA. RE: Afspraak over ingrediënten van tabaksproducten.
2009 Collection. Bates No: JB0616. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hqo18j00
(accessed 12 Sep 2013).
134 Philip Morris Benelux BVBA. RE: Impact assessment herziening
Tabaksproductenrichtlijn. 2010 Collection. Bates No: JB0626. http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/tid/rqo18j00 (accessed 12 Sep 2013).
135 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
Treaty of Lisbon, in 2007/C 306/01. Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union,
2007.
136 Petitjean S. Tobacco directive passes subsidiarity test. Clear The Air News Tobacco
Blog [Blog], 2013. http://tobacco.cleartheair.org.hk/?p=7112 (accessed 29 May
2014).
137 Joossens L. Update on the Tobacco Products Directive (as of June 2013). 2013;
18 December 20132. http://www.europeancancerleagues.org/tobacco-control/62-
tobacco-control-products-directive-in-the-eu/311-new-directive-2013.html (accessed
29 May 2014).
138 Kluver H. Lobbying in the European Union. Interest groups, lobbying coalitions,
and policy change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
139 Weishaar HB. Stakeholder engagement in European health policy. A network
analysis of the development of the European Council Recommendation on smoke-
free environments. University of Edinburgh, 2013.
140 Weishaar H, Amos A, Collin J. Capturing complexity: mixing methods in the
analysis of a European tobacco control policy network. Int J Soc Res Methodol
2014:1–18.
141 Martin A. Philip Morris Leads Plain Packs Battle in Global Trade Arena.
Bloomberg 2013; 22 August. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-22/
philip-morris-leads-plain-packs-battle-in-global-trade-arena.html (accessed
2 Sep 2013).
142 Tarkowski S, Ricciardi W. Health impact assessment in Europe—current dilemmas
and challenges. Eur J Public Health 2012;22:612.
143 Salay R, Lincoln P. The European Union and Health Impact Assessments. Are they
an unrecognised statutory obligation? 2008. http://www.safestroke.eu/ﬁles/8613/
8642/0470/HIA_Report.pdf (accessed 25 Jun 2014).
144 ALTER-EU. ALTER-EU Brieﬁng: review of revolving door rules in Staff
Regulations. 2013. http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/ALTER-
EU_Revolving%20door%20rules%20in%20Staff%20Regulations.pdf (accessed
25 Jun 2014).
145 Darbishire H, Bank M, de Clerck P, et al. FINAL Letter to Barroso on Revolving
Doors Commissioners 21 January 2014. Brussels, 2014.
146 Watson J. Meeting on revision of tobacco products directive. 3 May 2010 [Email],
2010.
147 Jonet N, Klaus H, Morel G. Meeting request. Email correspondence between
Nuno Jonet and Cabinet Barroso 7–14 June 2011. [Email], 2011.
148 Pappas SA. Re: request for a meeting. 13 June 2012 [Email]. Brussels, 2012.
Peeters S, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:108–117. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-051919 117
Research paper
